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Despite repeated warnings and threats to foreign powers over Taiwan, observers say Beijing has avoided spelling out the consequences of crossing its “red lines”. Photo: ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

Have Beijing’s ‘red lines’ on Taiwan sparked a white-hot dilemma?

  • Despite repeated warnings and threats to foreign powers over Taiwan, observers say Beijing has avoided spelling out consequences
  • Mainland China’s red lines have also created challenges in managing domestic expectations, experts say
Taiwan
In his first meeting with Joe Biden since he entered the White House, Chinese President Xi Jinping labelled the “Taiwan issue” the “first red line that must not be crossed” in China-US relations.

While the language seemed unambiguous, the statement appeared to do little to advance relations between the two nations, which have spiralled downward to the point where there are concerns of a potential military confrontation.

The self-ruled island – which Beijing considers a renegade province – has become a geopolitical flash point. Both China and the United States have increased their military presence in the Taiwan Strait as they continue to insist they oppose “unilateral changes in the status quo”. And while the phrase “red line” is being used more often, exactly where that line is remains unclear.

03:33

Xi, Biden discuss Taiwan and Xinjiang in first in-person meeting

Xi, Biden discuss Taiwan and Xinjiang in first in-person meeting

Historical misunderstanding?

When considering what constitutes crossing a red line that would trigger Beijing’s use of military force, Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law, which was passed in 2005, is the most commonly cited document by experts from Taiwan, mainland China and the United States.

The document provides a legal framework that specifies three conditions under which Beijing said it would use “non peaceful means” for Taiwan’s reunification. These include Taiwanese authorities formally pursuing secession from China, “incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China”, or a situation in which “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”

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Two years before the law was enacted, People’s Liberation Army military officers warned that a Taiwanese independence referendum could be considered cause for war.

In April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that a visit to Taiwan by US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi would be considered stepping on the red line. When Pelosi went ahead despite the warnings, Beijing responded by carrying out an unprecedented level of live-fire drills around the island, PLA fighter jets and drones crossed the median line – the de facto border between Taiwan and mainland China.

Yet, Beijing has remained vague about when and under what circumstances the law would be invoked. For years, the ambiguity has spurred discussions on the mainland to amend the law, especially the clause concerning the use of “non-peaceful” means.

Zhou Bo, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, said Beijing was likely to continue to refrain from specifying the circumstances under which force would be used, since the lingering haziness over consequences seemed to benefit Beijing, for now.

“The ambiguity is necessary, because the US also adopts strategic ambiguity on this matter. It is impossible for China to make it clear, but the bigger principles have been clear,” Zhou said, adding that he considered the Anti-Secession Law the most specific official red lines set out by Beijing to date.

Where do the ‘red lines’ lie today?

Washington’s policy has been to be intentionally vague about whether it would come to Taiwan’s defence if Beijing attacked. The stance is meant to deter the mainland from taking action, without the US committing itself to war.

There has been discussion in Washington about whether the policy should be abandoned in favour of “strategic clarity” for stronger deterrence. Over the course of his presidency, Biden has pledged several times that the US would defend Taiwan if Beijing were to attack the island.

Michael Mazarr, a Washington-based senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, said understanding what a red line was should not be oversimplified.

“[For China], a formalised policy of independence is the obvious red line, just as an outright unprovoked invasion is our obvious red line,” Mazarr said.

“But there’s also a much more amorphous idea that a collection of activities will cross some red line that is not defined at some point. And that’s kind of more dangerous.”

Mazarr said that a series of Taiwan-related policies was under way in the US that could potentially trigger a strong military response from Beijing.

The US Congress is set to look at the Taiwan Policy Act which has been described as the most comprehensive restructuring of US policy towards the island since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.

The bill proposes allowing Taiwan the same treatment as any other major non-Nato ally, by allocating US$4.5 billion in security help over four years. It would also set up a broad economic sanctions scheme to target Beijing officials and financial institutions in case of “hostilities” towards Taiwan.

02:20

Taiwan showcases combat drones as self-ruled island aims to bolster defences

Taiwan showcases combat drones as self-ruled island aims to bolster defences

Zhou, who joined the PLA in the late 1970s and served in a range of high-level posts, said even without absolute clarity on China’s red line, the US would be able to make an assessment.

“The most important thing is for the US to know that we have a red line. As to what the red line is – they can try to test it by many means, like exchanges with the Chinese side … and for example our reaction towards Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. We have reacted on an unprecedented level,” Zhou said.

“So if there is another visit like this next time, in a way, China’s response would be predictable in a way.”

‘Red line’ or red carpet?

Beijing’s repeated warnings not to cross its red lines have also raised what some observers see as a dilemma in managing domestic expectations.

When Pelosi went ahead with her Taiwan trip despite Beijing’s warnings, nationalistic sentiment surged on social media, with some suggesting Beijing was being too weak.

“The red line has been stepped on so many times that it must have become a red carpet by now,” said one popular Weibo post.

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Mazarr described Beijing’s red line dilemma as “reverse salami slicing”. The phrase “salami slicing” has been used frequently by Beijing to describe a series of actions that it would consider as backing Taiwan’s independence.
“It’s not only the United States, it’s also European and Asian countries that are, you know, kind of turning the dial in the other direction in terms of Taiwan’s international recognition, countries willing to engage with it, countries willing to sell it weapons … and at some point, it will cross what might be described as a red line. How do we stop it? That’s a huge dilemma for them,” Mazarr said.

“So I think that to me, this idea of a creeping red line is maybe the bigger strategic challenge than really explicit red lines.”

“Looking at the historical piece of this and other examples of deterrence and potential for aggression, an objective assessment about whether you’re going to win is not usually the thing that makes the difference. Countries go to war when they think they have to,” Mazarr said.

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